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Abstract. Sabotage modal logic was proposed in 2003 as a format for
analyzing games that modify graphs they are played on. We investi-
gate some model-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects of sabotage modal
logic, which has come to be viewed as an early dynamic logic of graph
change. Our first result is a characterization theorem for sabotage modal
logic as a fragment of first-order logic which is invariant with respect to
a natural notion of ‘sabotage bisimulation’. Next, we offer a sound and
complete tableau method and its associated labeled sequent calculus for
analyzing reasoning in sabotage modal logic. Finally, we identify and
briefly explore a number of open research problems concerning sabotage
modal logic that illuminate its complexity, placing it within the current
landscape of modal logics that analyze model update, and, returning to
the original motivation of sabotage, fixed-point logics for network games.
1 Introduction
Sabotage modal logic (SML), first introduced in [44], expands basic modal logic
with a modality ϕ saying “after the deletion of at least one edge in the frame,
it holds that ϕ”. This minimal modal logic of arbitrary edge deletion stands at
the start of a line of systems in a dynamic-epistemic spirit [46], such as ‘graph
modifier logic’ [8], ‘swap logic’ [3], or ‘arrow update logic’ [31,1]. SML is also
directly related to recent work in theoretical computer science [39,29], learning
theory [24], logics of social networks [42,32], and argumentation [26,27].
Only a few properties of sabotage modal logic have been studied in depth
so far. The source paper [44] showed how SML can formulate solution concepts
for sabotage games, it gave a SPACE upper bound for model checking, and it
sketched how the SML language can be translated into first-order logic, though
the validities are not closed under substitutions. More incisive results are in
[34,33], where multi-modal SML is shown to have an undecidable satisfiability
problem and a PSPACE-complete model-checking problem. A main open problem
mentioned in [34,33] is a bisimulation invariance characterization for SML. This
was solved independently in the proceedings version of the present article [9]
and in the work of an Argentinean team [4]. Also independently, both teams
developed tableau systems to analyze the structure of validity in SML, cf. [2,4].
We will discuss some connections in Section 8.1 at the end of this paper.
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Outline Our paper has two parts. The first, comprising Sections 2 to 5, extends
the material in [9] with proofs left out there, while adding a labeled sequent cal-
culus, several new examples and a few small novel observations. The two main
contributions are a characterization result for SML (Section 4) as that fragment
of first-order logic which is invariant for a natural notion of ‘sabotage bisimu-
lation’ (Section 3) and a novel tableau system and matching sequent calculus
in Section 5. The second part of the paper is more exploratory. Sections 6 to 7
present new material addressing the issue of what makes SML tick among current
modal logics of model change, where we identify the sources of its undecidability
in a way that also sheds new light on current dynamic-epistemic logics. Moreover,
we make a systematic connection with fixed-point logics of sabotage for analyz-
ing graph games, and revisit the original motivation for SML in sabotage games.
Section 8 discusses related work. Section 9 concludes and emphasizes once more
how sabotage modal logics can serve as a laboratory for broader graph games.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the syntax and semantics of SML, recapitulate some
key results from [33], and present a standard translation from SML into FOL.
2.1 Syntax and semantics
Let P be a countable set of propositional atoms. The sabotage modal language
Ls is the set of ‘sabotage formulas’ defined by the following grammar in BNF:
Ls : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ♦ϕ | ϕ
where p ∈ P. We add some useful notation. For all ϕ,ψ ∈ Ls, we define the
usual abbreviations: ϕ∨ψ , ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ), ϕ→ ψ , ¬ϕ∨ψ, ⊥ , p∧¬p, > , ¬⊥
(for an arbitrary p ∈ P). For all ϕ ∈ Ls, we define iterated formulas as follows:
for all M ∈ {,♦,,}, M0ϕ , ϕ and for all n ∈ N, Mn+1ϕ , MMnϕ. To
save parentheses, binding strength is in this order: ,,,♦,¬,∧,∨,→. Also,
we will use the ‘sabotage depth’ sd(ϕ) of formulas ϕ, [33], defined inductively by:
sd(p) , 0, sd(¬ϕ) , sd(ϕ), sd(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) , max{sd(ϕ1), sd(ϕ2)}, sd(♦ϕ) , sd(ϕ)
and sd(ϕ) , sd(ϕ) + 1. Hence, in particular, sd(>) = 0.
We work with standard relational models M = (W,R, V ) for modal logic
(‘models’, for short), with W a non-empty set; R ⊆W ×W , and V : P −→ 2W .
A pair F = (W,R) is called a frame. We write w ∈ M for w ∈ W , and call a
pair (M, w) a ‘pointed model’, the class of which isM. The satisfaction relation
|= ⊆ M × Ls is defined inductively by truth conditions. Those for the Boolean
and modal connectives ¬,∧,♦ are as usual, and the truth condition for  is:
(W,R, V ), w |= ϕ iff there is (u, v) ∈ R s.t. (W,R \ {(u, v)}, V ), w |= ϕ.
Thus, ϕ is true in a pointed model if there are two R-related (possibly identical)
states such that, if the edge between these states is removed from R, ϕ holds
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at the distinguished state. (If no such pair exists, ϕ is false for any ϕ.) The
triple SML , (Ls,M, |=) is called sabotage modal logic. Satisfiability, validity
and logical consequence for SML are defined as usual.
We can also restate this slightly differently to emphasize the bimodal flavor
of our logic. Define a relation r ⊆M×M with ((W,R, V,w), (W ′, R′, V ′, w′)) ∈ r
iff W ′ = W ; R′ = R \ {(u, v)} for some u, v ∈W ; V ′ = V and w′ = w. Then the
above truth condition for the sabotage modality makes it a standard existential
modality referring to this ordering between models. We can also iterate this
order in the obvious way, to talk about models reachable in finitely many r-
steps, obtaining the relation r∗.
As usual, our standard relational models can also be interpreted as models
for the binary fragment of FOL with equality1 denoted L1. Sometimes in the
proofs to follow we will use the following first-order terminology and notation.
We say that a modelM satisfies a formula ϕ(x) ∈ L1 (or a set Γ (x) ⊆ L1) with
one free variable x under the assignment of w to x if, and only if, ϕ (respectively
Γ ) is true of w – or in symbols, M |= ϕ(x)[w] (respectively, M |= Γ (x)[w]).
We say that a model M realizes a set Γ (x) ⊆ L1 with one free variable x (also
called a ‘type’) if there exists an element w ∈W such that M |= Γ (x)[w].
If (M, w) ∈M, the sabotage modal theory of (M, w) is the set Ts(M, w) ,
{ϕ ∈ Ls | M, w |= ϕ}. We also define the binary relation!s⊆M×M as follows:
(M, w)!s (M′, w′) (for ((M, w), (M′, w′)) ∈!s) iff for all ϕ ∈ Ls, M, w |=
ϕ iff M′, w′ |= ϕ. In that case, we say that (M, w) and (M′, w′) are sabotage
modally equivalent (that is, they satisfy the same sabotage modal formulas).
2.2 Some notable validities and expressible properties
We list some validities of SML that demonstrate how the deletion modality works:
⊥ → ⊥ (1)
⊥ → ⊥ (2)
p→ p (3)
(p ∧ ¬⊥)→ p (4)
p→ (♦> → ♦p) (5)
♦ϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ→ > (6)
The fact that we are using propositional atoms instead for variables for formulas
in the first five of the above validities is not accidental. Surprisingly, many prima
facie valid-looking principles fail for SML in their full schematic form with all
complex substitution instances once we realize that under a deletion modality,
ordinary modalities can change their truth values.
A good example is principle (5). Consider its schematic formulation
ϕ→ (♦> → ♦ϕ), (7)
1 One can check [12, Ch. 2.4] for basics of this first-order correspondence language.
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Fig. 1. A model showing that the general schema ϕ → (♦> → ♦ϕ) fails in
SML. Let ϕ , ♦♦p, let V (p) = {a}, and let the evaluation point be e.
which states that if every accessible state satisfies ϕ, then after any link deletion,
if the evaluation state still has a successor, it still has a ϕ-successor. The formula
may fail if ϕ is modal, since deletion may happen deeper in the model and disrupt
the truth of ϕ at successor states. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
In the above list, only the last item (6) is a schematic validity.2 Still, any
logic has a ‘substitution core’ consisting of its schematically valid principles, cf.
[46], and it is an interesting open problem whether SML has a decidable, or even
an axiomatizable substitution core.3
Next, SML can express properties beyond the reach of standard modal logic.
Examples are: “there are at most n successors of the current state” with 1 ≤ n
(Expression (8), but see also Example 2 of Section 4 below); “there exist at
least two successors or, there exists at most one successor and at least another
state with at least one successor” (Expression (9)); “there exists no successor
but there is at least one state with at least one successor” (Expression (10)). All
these properties have FOL formulations using counting quantifiers:
∃≤ny (xRy) (8)
∃≥2y (xRy) ∨ (∃≤1y (xRy) ∧ ∃y(x 6= y ∧ ∃z(yRz)) (9)
¬∃y(xRy) ∧ ∃y(∃z(yRz)) (10)
These properties can be expressed in SML by, in the same order:
⊥ ∨
∨
1≤i≤n
i⊥ (11)
♦> (12)
⊥ ∧ > (13)
None of the above properties is expressible in the standard modal language, and
defining them involves various hybrid extensions, such as graded modalities [16],
the difference modality, and the universal modality [12, Ch. 7].
2 A formula ϕ of a language L is a schematic validity on a class of models if σ(ϕ) is
valid in that class for any substitution σ of arbitrary formulas for proposition letters.
3 The analogous open problem for the much simpler dynamic-epistemic logic PAL of
public announcement was only solved in [30]: it turned out to be decidable.
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Another sign of strength for SML is its power to define frames up to isomor-
phism. For instance, it is a simple exercise to show that the formula
♦> ∧♦> ∧⊥ (14)
is true in a model if and only if its underlying frame consists of one reflexive
point. This observation can be generalized to cycles of any length.
Fact 1 For each positive natural number n, there exists an SML formula ϕ such
that, for any model M = (W,R, V ) and state s: M, s |= ϕ if, and only if, the
frame (W,R) is a cycle of length n.
Proof. We show how to build the desired formula. Define first:
PATH (n) ,
∧
0≤i≤n
i♦> ∧
 ∨
0≤i≤n−1
♦i⊥

Each such formula forces the existence of exactly one path of length n+ 1 from
the evaluation point. The desired formula is then defined inductively as follows:
CYCLE (1) , PATH (1) = (14)
CYCLE (n+ 1) , PATH (n) ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
(¬♦n−in−iCYCLE (i))
The base case is immediate. As to the induction step, the first conjunct forced
existence of a unique path of length at least n from the current state. The second
conjunct forces the (n− 1)th -step in such a path to end in the current state. uunionsq
2.3 A First-Order Translation for SML
A standard first-order translation for SML was sketched in [44] and [34]. Later
on, a detailed translation was independently given in the proceedings version
of this paper [9] and in [4]. In this section we describe the translation and its
correctness in detail. This prepares for the later sections of the article.
Setting up the translation In order to define a translation from the language
of SML into the free variable fragment of FOL with equality one needs to keep
track of the changes that the sabotage operators introduce in the model.
This is achieved by indexing the standard translation with a set E of pairs of
variables. When the translation is applied to the outermost operator of a given
formula, this set is empty. As analysis proceeds towards inner operators, each
sabotage operator  in the formula will introduce a new pair of variables in E,
which is bound by an existential quantifier. Here is the formal definition:
Definition 1 (Standard translation for SML). Let E be a set of pairs (y, z)
of variables—standing for edges—and let x be a designated variable. The trans-
lation STEx : Ls −→ L1 is recursively defined as follows:
6 G. Aucher, J. van Benthem and D. Grossi
STEx (p) , P (x) STEx (⊥) , ¬(x = x)
STEx (¬ϕ) , ¬STEx (ϕ) STEx (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) , STEx (ϕ1) ∧ STEx (ϕ2)
STEx (♦ϕ) , ∃y
xRy ∧ ∧
(v,w)∈E
¬(x = v ∧ y = w) ∧ STEy (ϕ)

STEx (ϕ) , ∃y, z
yRz ∧ ∧
(v,w)∈E
¬(y = v ∧ z = w) ∧ STE∪{(y,z)}x (ϕ)

In the inductive clauses, a standard modality ♦ϕ translates as a first-order
formula with x free, stating there exists a state y accessible from x via an edge
different from all edges in the set E, with the translation of ϕ holding at y.
Formula ϕ becomes a first-order formula saying there is some R-edge (y, z)
different from any edge already in E, that the translation of ϕ should now be
taken with respect to the set E∪{(y, z)}, and that the result holds at x. Setting
up the translation like this lets one book-keep removal of edges in a perspicuous
manner via E, forcing modalities to access ever smaller relations.
It is important to notice the following feature of this procedure. Depending
on the chosen E, STE can possibly yield formulas with several free variables, e.g.:
ST {(v,w)}x ♦p = ∃y (xRy ∧ ¬(x = v ∧ y = w) ∧ p) . However, if STE is applied to
a formula ϕ by setting E = ∅, that is to say, if the translation is initiated with
an empty E, then, at each successive application of STE to subformulas of ϕ,
the variables occurring in W will be bound by some quantifiers introduced at
previous steps. For any ϕ, ST ∅x (ϕ) yields a FOL formula with only x free.
Example 1. We illustrate the translation by means of an example:
ST ∅x (♦♦p) = ∃y, z
(
yRz ∧ ST {(y,z)}x (♦♦p)
)
= ∃y, z
(
yRz ∧ ∃v
(
xRv ∧ ¬(x = y ∧ v = z) ∧ ST {(y,z)}v (♦p)
))
= ∃y (xRy ∧ ∃v (xRv ∧ ¬(x = x ∧ y = z)∧
∃y′, z′
(
y′Rz′ ∧ ¬(y′ = y ∧ z′ = z) ∧ ST {(y,z),(y′,z′)}v (♦p)
)))
= ∃y, z (yRz ∧ ∃v (xRv ∧ ¬(x = x ∧ y = z)∧
∃y′, z′ (y′Rz′ ∧ ¬(y′ = y ∧ z′ = z)∧
∃v′ (vRv′ ∧ ¬(v = y ∧ v′ = z) ∧ ¬(v = y′ ∧ v′ = z′)∧
ST
{(y,z),(y′,z′)}
v′ (p)))))
= ∃y, z (yRz ∧ ∃v (xRv ∧ ¬(x = x ∧ y = z)∧
∃y′, z′ (y′Rz′ ∧ ¬(y′ = y ∧ z′ = z)∧
∃v′ (vRv′ ∧ ¬(v = y ∧ v′ = z) ∧ ¬(v = y′ ∧ v′ = z′) ∧ p))))
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This formula states that after some sabotage it is still possible to reach a state
where, after a second sabotage, a p-state can be reached.
Correctness of the translation To check this complex syntax, we now sketch
a proof of the correctness of the translation proposed in Definition 1.
Theorem 1. Let (M, w) be a pointed model and ϕ ∈ Ls:
M, w |= ϕ iff M |= ST ∅x (ϕ)[w]
Proof. This goes by induction on the structure of ϕ. The key inductive step for
the sabotage operator  is proven by the equivalences that use the inductive
hypothesis plus the semantics of  and the definition of our translation ST:
M, w |= ϕ iff there existsM′ with (M, w)r(M′, w) and M′, w |= ϕ
iff there exists M′ with (M, w)r(M′, w) and M′ |= ST ∅x (ϕ)[w]
iff M |= ST ∅x (ϕ)[w] uunionsq
While this translation is mainly a tool for us, it does exhibit some interesting
features. The standard translation for modal logic takes formulas into the two-
variable fragment of first-order logic. Here, however, things are different.
Proposition 1. SML is not contained in any fixed variable fragment of FOL.
Proof. Consider the SML formulas of Section 2 with counting quantifiers for at
most n accessible worlds. It is well-known that no fixed finite-variable fragment
FO(k) of FOL can define all of these, since the Ehrenfeucht k-pebble game that
is characteristic for such a fragment, cf. [47, Ch. 14], cannot distinguish between
pointed models having at most k and at most k + 1 accessible worlds. uunionsq
Finally, it may be pointed out that our translation can be viewed in two
ways. It may be seen as showing that SML formulas are pretty messy first-order
formulas, involving a lot of variable binding. But it may also be seen as showing
that SML is a quite succinct variable-free notation for a complex part of FOL.4
3 Bisimulation for SML
In this section, we introduce a notion of ‘sabotage bisimulation’ for SML, a
task left open in [34,33]. The invariance results enabled by this new notion of
bisimulation (that is, Propositions 2 and 3 below) were independently proven in
[9] and [4], albeit in slightly different formulations.
4 Stating and proving precise succinctness results for SML is in fact one more inter-
esting open problem about sabotage modal logic.
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3.1 Sabotage Bisimulation
Definition 2 (s-bisimulation). Let M1 = (W1, R1, V1), M2 = (W2, R2, V2)
be two relational models. A non-empty relation Z ⊆ r∗(M1, w)×r∗(M2, v) is an
s-bisimulation between the two pointed models (M1, w) and (M2, v)—notation,
Z : (M1, w) -s (M2, v)—if the following conditions are satisfied:
Atom: If (M1, w)Z(M2, v) then M1, w |= p iff M2, v |= p, for any atom p.
Zig♦: If (M1, w)Z(M2, v) and there exists w′ ∈W1 s.t. wR1w′ then there exists
v′ ∈W2 s.t. vR2v′ and (M1, w′)Z(M2, v′);
Zag♦: If (M1, w)Z(M2, v) and there exists v′ ∈ Ss s.t. vR1v′ then there exists
w′ ∈W1 s.t. wR1w′ and (M1, w′)Z(M2, v′);
Zig: If (M1, w)Z(M2, v) and there exists M′1 such that (M1, w)r(M′1, w),
then there exists M′2 such that (M2, v)r(M′2, v) and (M′1, w)Z(M′2, v);
Zag: If (M1, w)Z(M2, v) and there exists M′2 such that (M2, v)r(M′2, v),
then there exists M′1 such that (M1, w)r(M′1, w) and (M′1, w)Z(M′2, v).
For brevity we write (M1, w) -s (M2, v) if there exists an s-bisimulation Z such
that (M1, w)Z(M2, v).
The notion of s-bisimulation strengthens the standard modal bisimulation with
back and forth conditions for the sabotage modality. Here, just as the sabo-
tage modality is an ‘external’ modality looking across different models, so is
s-bisimulation an ‘external’ notion of bisimulation. Standard bisimulation keeps
a relational graph model fixed and changes the evaluation point along the ac-
cessibility relation of the model, s-bisimulation keeps the evaluation point fixed
but changes the model by picking one among the sabotage-accessible ones.
3.2 Bisimulation and Modal Equivalence in SML
We first show that s-bisimulation implies SML equivalence.
Proposition 2 (-s ⊆!s). For any two pointed models (M1, w) and (M2, v),
if (M1, w) -s (M2, v), then (M1, w)!s (M2, v).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the syntax of ϕ. Let (M1, w)Z(M2, v). Base
Case: The Atom clause of Definition 2 covers the propositional constants. Induc-
tion Step: The Boolean cases are routine as usual. The Zig♦ and Zag♦ clauses of
Definition 2 take care of ♦-formulas in a standard way familiar from basic modal
logic. As for -formulas, assume that M1, w |= ϕ. By the semantics of , we
have (M1, w)r(M′1, w) and M′1, w |= ϕ and, by clause Zig of Definition 2, it
follows that (M2, v)r(M′2, v) and (M′1, w)Z(M′2, v). By the inductive hypoth-
esis, we conclude that M′2, v |= ϕ and, consequently, M2, v |= ϕ. Similarly,
fromM2, v |= ϕ, we concludeM1, w |= ϕ by clause Zag of Definition 2. uunionsq
Just as for the standard modal language, the converse of Proposition 2 can
be proven in case the models at issue are ‘ω-saturated’. To introduce this notion,
we need some notation. Given a finite set Y , the expansion of L1 with a finite
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set of constants Y is denoted by L1Y , and the expansion of a relational modelM
to L1Y is denoted by MY .5 In what follows, x is a finite tuple of variables.
Definition 3 (ω-saturation). A model M = (W,R, V ) is ω-saturated if, for
every Y ⊆ W such that |Y | < ω, the expansion MY realizes every set Γ (x) of
L1Y -formulas whose finite subsets Γ ′(x) ⊆ Γ (x) are all realized in MY .
Thus, a model M is ω-saturated if for any set of formulas Γ (x, y1, . . . , yn)
over a finite set of ‘running variables’ x and ‘parameters’ y1, ..., yn, once some
interpretation of the y1, . . . , yn is fixed to, say, w1, . . . , wn, and all finite subsets
of Γ (x)[w1, . . . , wn] are realizable in M, then the whole of Γ (x)[w1, . . . , wn] is
realizable inM. From a standard modal point of view, Definition 3 requires that,
if for any subset of Γ there are accessible states satisfying it at the evaluation
point, then there are accessible states satisfying the whole of Γ at the evaluation
point. However, what we need for SML is slightly stronger, since we need to find
pairs of states so as to satisfy a given type involving deletion, as we shall see.
Proposition 3 (!s ⊆ -s). For any two ω-saturated pointed models (M1, w1)
and (M2, w2), if (M1, w1)!s (M2, w2), then (M1, w1) -s (M2, w2).
Proof. We show that the relation !s itself is an s-bisimulation (cf. Definition
2). Base Case: The condition Atom is straightforwardly satisfied, being a spe-
cial case of modal equivalence of points. Back and Forth Conditions: The proof
for conditions Zig♦ and Zag♦ proceeds as usual for basic modal languages. We
prove that the condition Zig is satisfied. Assume that (M1, w1)!s (M2, w2)
and (M1, w1)r(M′1, w1). We show there must be a model (M′2, w2) such that
(M2, w2)r(M′2, w2) and (M′1, w1) !s (M′2, w2). For a start, we have that for
any finite Γ ⊆ Ts(M′1, w1) the following sequence of equivalences holds:
M1, w1 |= 
∧
Γ iff M2, w2 |= 
∧
Γ
iff M2 |= ST ∅x
(

∧
Γ
)
[w2]
iff M2 |= ∃y, z
(
yRz ∧ ST {(y,z)}x
(∧
Γ
))
[w2]
The first equivalence holds by the assumption of sabotage equivalence between
(M1, w1) and (M2, w2). The second follows by Theorem 1 and the third one
by Definition 1. From this, by ω-saturation of M2 with respect to types having
pairs of running variables as mentioned above, we can conclude that:
There are y, z ∈M2 such that yRz and M2 |= ST {(y,z)}x (Ts(M′1, w1)) [w2].
Using Theorem 1, it follows that there is a pointed model (M′2, w′2) with
(M2, w2)r(M′2, w′2) and M′2 |= ST ∅x (Ts(M′1, w1)) [w2]. Finally, it is immediate
that (M′1, w1)!s (M′2, w2), which completes the proof of the Zig clause.
5 For basic facts on ω-saturation we refer the reader to [12, Ch. 2] and [13, Ch. 2].
The first use of the following proof method for modal logic is found in [43].
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In the same way it can be shown that also the condition Zag is satisfied. 6 uunionsq
We have thus established a precise match between sabotage modal equivalence
and sabotage bisimulation for the special class of ω-saturated models.7
4 Characterization of SML by Invariance
We now extend a classical result for basic modal logic. We characterize SML as
the one free variable fragment of FOL that is invariant under s-bisimulation.8
Theorem 2 (Characterization of SML by s-bisimulation invariance). An
L1-formula is equivalent to the translation of an Ls formula if, and only if, it is
invariant for sabotage bisimulation.
Proof. The direction from left to right follows from Proposition 2. In the op-
posite direction, we proceed as customary. Let ϕ ∈ L1 with one free variable x.
Assume that ϕ is invariant under s-bisimulation and consider the following set:
Cs(ϕ) , {ST ∅x (ψ) | ψ ∈ Ls and ϕ |= ST ∅x (ψ)}.
The result is a direct consequence of the following two claims:
(a) If Cs(ϕ) |= ϕ, then ϕ is equivalent to the translation of an Ls-formula.
(b) In fact, Cs(ϕ) |= ϕ – that is, for any pointed model (M, w):
if M |= Cs(ϕ)[w], then M |= ϕ[w].
Claim (a). Assume that Cs(ϕ) |= ϕ. From the deduction and compactness
theorems for FOL, we have that |=
∧
Γ → ϕ for some finite Γ ⊂ Cs(ϕ). The
converse holds by the definition of Cs(ϕ): |= ϕ →
∧
Γ . We thus have that
|= ϕ↔
∧
Γ , proving the claim.
Claim (b). Take any pointed model M, w such that M |= Cs(ϕ)[w] and
consider its sabotage modal theory Ts(M, w). Now consider the set of formulas
Σ = ST ∅x (Ts(M, w)) ∪ {ϕ}. We first show that:
(c) Σ is consistent.
To prove (c), assume, towards a contradiction, that Σ is inconsistent. By the
compactness of FOL we then obtain that |= ϕ → ¬
∧
Γ for some finite Γ ∈ Σ.
But then, by the definition of Cs(ϕ), we have that ¬
∧
Γ ∈ Cs(ϕ), and hence
¬
∧
Γ ∈ ST ∅x (Ts(M, w)), which is impossible since Γ ⊂ ST ∅x (Ts(M, w)).
Now Claim (b) follows if we can show that
6 One final thing to check is that the new models obtained are still ω-saturated. This
requires a small additional argument translating formulas satisfied at points s in the
models M′ after the link deletion into formulas satisfied at s in the original M.
7 Obtaining this result for any two models requires using an infinitary version of SML.
8 Recall that the standard translation ST ∅ of a sabotage modal logic formula always
produces a FOL formula with only one free variable.
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a
b c
d
b′
d′
c′
a′ a′′
Fig. 2. Two s-bisimilar models (the s-bisimulation runs via the dashed lines).
At state d to the left, the property “every two successors share a joint successor”
is true. But it fails at point d′ in the model to the right.
(d) M |= ϕ[w].
Here is a proof for (d). As Σ is consistent, it can be satisfied by a pointed model,
say, (M′, w′). Observe first that M, w!sM′, w′ as both have the same SML
theory. Now take two ω-saturated elementary extensions (Mω, w) and (M′ω, w′)
of (M, w) and (M′, w′). That such extensions exist can be proven by a standard
chain construction argument, [13, Proposition 3.2.6].
Then, by the invariance of FOL under elementary extensions, fromM′ |= ϕ[w]
(by the construction of Σ), we get that M′ω |= ϕ[w]. By the assumption that
ϕ is invariant for s-bisimulation and Proposition 3, we get Mω |= ϕ[w] – and
then, by elementary extension, M |= ϕ[w]. This completes the proof. uunionsq
Definable and undefinable properties in SML. So which FOL properties
belong to the fragment identified by Theorem 2 and which ones do not? We
provide examples of SML-definable and undefinable properties of models.
Example 2 (Counting successors). Consider the earlier-discussed FOL property
“there exist at most n successors” of the current point. This property is not
standard modal bisimulation invariant, but it is easy to see that it is invariant
with respect to sabotage bisimulation. It is therefore definable in SML, something
that we had established already by a direct argument.
Example 3 (Confluence). Consider the FOL property “every two successors of
the current point have a shared successor”. This property is not invariant for
sabotage bisimulation, witness Figure 2, and hence it is not definable in SML.
Caveat. Technically, some care is needed here, because SML works in a universe
of changing models. For a sabotage bisimulation, one should draw not only the
two base models, but also all sub-models obtainable by one edge deletion, two
edge deletions, and so forth. So it is worth spending some time to see why the
dashed lines in the relatively simple Figure 2 indeed form a sabotage bisimulation
Z between the model M on the left and M′ on the right.
Notice that the accessibility relations in both models have the same cardi-
nality, that is, 4. We proceed inductively as follows.9 Consider ri(M, d) and
9 Technically speaking this reasoning involves a double induction.
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1 2 3 4 . . .
1′ 2′ 3′ 4′ . . .
Fig. 3. Two infinite chains (N,≥) and (N, >), with transitive edges omitted in
both frames. Only the part of the s-bisimulation relation originating in points 1
and 2′ is depicted. The remaining edges at other points are positioned similarly.
ri(M′, d′) with 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, that is the submodels that can be reached on the left,
respectively right, model via exactly i edge deletions.
For the base case, with M4, s ∈ r4(M, d) and M′4, s′ ∈ r4(M′, d′), it is
obvious that (M4, s)Z(M′4, s′) is a sabotage bisimulation for any s, s′ with sZs′
as in the picture: no successors exist, no further deletion can be carried out.
For the induction step, first notice that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, for any Mi−1 ∈
ri−1(M, d), there exists M′i−1 ∈ ri−1(M′, d′) such that (Mi−1, s)Z(M′i−1, s′),
with sZs′ as in the picture, is a standard bisimulation. That is, for any pointed
submodel reachable on the left with i deletions, there exists a pointed submodel
on the right for which Z is a standard modal bisimulation. Then, to complete
the induction step, we need to show that, if (Mi, s)Z(M′i, s′) is a sabotage
bisimulation, with sZs′ as in the picture, then for any Mi−1 ∈ ri−1(M, d),
there exists M′i−1 ∈ ri−1(M′, d′) such that (Mi−1, s)Z(M′i−1, s′) is a sabotage
bisimulation, and vice versa. In words, if two pointed submodels reachable via
i deletions are sabotage bisimilar, then for any pointed submodel reachable by
i−1 deletions on the left, there is a pointed submodel reachable by i−1 deletions
on the right such that Z is a sabotage bisimulation connecting the two.
A visual inspection of the bisimulation relation depicted in Figure 2 shows
that this is indeed the case. Hence confluence is not SML-definable.
Example 4 (Reflexive states). Consider the FOL property xRx. This property is
not invariant with respect to sabotage bisimulation. To witness this fact take
two models M = (N,≥) and M′ = (N, >) on the set of natural numbers (with
0 as the distinguished point in each case) where the accessibility relations are:
(a) on the first model, the ‘greater or equal’ relation (reflexive), and (b) on the
second model, the strictly greater relation (irreflexive).
Now we have that (M, 0) -s (M′, 0). Figure 3 shows this fact by depicting
(part of) a relation which is a standard modal bisimulation Z between the two
models, but which in addition has the property that any edge deletion on one
model can be ‘mirrored’ on the other model to obtain pointed models that are
still connected by Z (in the sense of Definition 2). In particular, in the picture,
observe that deletion of a reflexive edge in M at point i can be ‘mirrored’ by
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the deletion of edge (i, i + 1) in M′ (here, note that the accessibility relations
are transitive in both models). However, M |= xRx[0], whereas M′ 6|= xRx[0].
The reflexivity property xRx is therefore not definable in SML.
5 Proof Systems for SML
What about explicit proof calculi for reasoning in sabotage modal logic? As we
shall see later, unlike dynamic-epistemic logics, SML does not support recursion
axioms that can be added in a straightforward manner to a standard modal base
logic to axiomatize the dynamic system. Indeed, we have not been able to find a
natural Hilbert-style formulation for SML. Therefore, we turn to methods that
are easier to formulate staying close to the semantics. This flexibility is provided
when we deal with the satisfiability problem by semantic tableaux and when we
deal with the validity problem by their dual, the labeled sequent calculi.
5.1 A Tableau Method for SML
Tableaux for SML cannot be quite like their standard modal counterparts for
systems like K, since there are some obvious background differences. For instance,
SML does not have the tree-model property: there are specific SML formulas
satisfied in relational models whose underlying frames can not be trees.10 The
following procedure is the adaptation that we need.
Definition 4 (Label, (extended) labeled formula and (relation) term).
Let S be an infinite set whose elements are called labels. A labeled formula is
an expression of the form x : ϕ where x is a label and ϕ ∈ Ls. A term is a
pair (x1, x2), where x1, x2 ∈ S. A relation term is an expression of the form
x1Rx2 where x1, x2 ∈ S. An extended label is an expression of the form xE
where x ∈ S and E is a finite set of terms. An extended labeled formula is an
expression of the form xE : ϕ where xE is an extended label and ϕ ∈ Ls.
Labels x represent worlds of modal models, while a relation term x1Rx2 rep-
resents that the pair of worlds represented by (x1, x2) belongs to the accessibility
relation R. The set of pairs E in xE represents the pairs of worlds of the acces-
sibility relation R that have been removed by application of the rule for  from
the Kripke model constructed at this stage by the tableau method.
Definition 5 (Tableau). A (labeled) tableau is a tree whose nodes are labeled
with extended labeled formulas or relation terms. The tableau tree for a formula is
constructed as shown in the algorithm of Figure 4. In the tableau rules of Figure
5, the formulas above the horizontal lines are called numerators and those below
are called denominators. A tableau closes when all its branches are closed. A
branch is open when it is infinite or it terminates in a leaf labeled open.
10 For example, our earlier formula ♦>∧♦>∧⊥ in Section 2 was true in a model
if and only if its underlying frame consists of one reflexive point.
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Input: A formula ϕ ∈ Ls.
Output: A tableau T for ϕ: each branch may be infinite, finite and labeled open,
or finite and labeled closed.
1. Initially, T is a tree consisting of a single root node labeled with x∅ : ϕ.
2. Repeat the following steps as long as possible:
(a) Choose a branch which is neither closed nor open and choose an extended
labeled formula xE : ψ (or a pair of extended labeled formula xE : ψ and
relation term x1Rx2) not selected before on this branch.
(b) Apply the appropriate tableau rule of Figure 5 to xE : ψ (or the pair
xE : ψ, x1Rx2):
– if the tableau rule is rule ¬∧ (or rules ♦, ), add two successor nodes
(resp. n + 1, n successor nodes) to the branch labeled with the in-
stantiations of the denominators of that rule,
– otherwise, add a unique successor node labeled with the instantiation
of the denominator(s) of that rule.
(c) i. Label by × (closed) the (new) branches which contain two extended
labeled formulas xE : p and xF : ¬p (where E and F may possibly be
different sets) or two extended labeled formulas xE : ϕ and xE : ¬ϕ.
ii. Label by  (open) the (new) branches where there are no more for-
mulas to decompose.
Fig. 4. Construction of a SML tableau.
We briefly discuss the modal and sabotage rules, those for the propositional
connectives being as usual. The rules ¬♦ and ¬ are natural adaptations of the
standard rule ¬♦ of modal logic. The only difference is that they can be applied
only to relation terms representing edges not already removed by the sabotage
modality, and therefore not present in E. For the rule ¬, moreover, the edge
removed is added to the set E of the edges already removed. The rule ♦ is more
complex than the standard modal rule, because SML does not have the tree-
model property, unlike standard modal logic. So, we have to consider not only
that a new world/label x0, which is accessible from x, may satisfy ϕ, but also
that one of the worlds/labels xi of the current model, which have already been
introduced, may satisfy ϕ. In that case we also put an accessibility relation from
x to this old world/label xi. The rule  follows the same kind of resasoning: we
may remove an edge represented by a pair of worlds/labels which has already
been introduced or which contains either one or two ‘fresh’ worlds/labels.
The construction of a tableau need not terminate: see Example 5. This is in
line with the fact that the satisfiability problem of SML is undecidable.11
Example 5. In Figure 6, on the right, we display the execution of the tableau
method of Figure 4 on the formula ♦>∧♦>∧⊥. We obtain a single open
11 If we remove the rules for sabotage we get a sound and complete tableau method
for logic K that is somewhat non-standard and computationally demanding.
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xE : ϕ ∧ ψ
xE : ϕ xE : ψ
∧ x
E : ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
xE : ¬ϕ | xE : ¬ψ
¬∧ x
E : ¬¬ϕ
xE : ϕ
¬¬
xE1 : ¬♦ϕ x1Rx2
xE2 : ¬ϕ
¬♦ x
E : ¬ϕ x1Rx2
xE∪{(x1,x2)} : ¬ϕ
¬
where (x1, x2) /∈ E in both rules above.
xE : ♦ϕ
xRx1 , x
E
1 : ϕ | . . . | xRxn , xEn : ϕ | xRx0 , xE0 : ϕ
♦
where {x1, . . . , xn} are all the labels occurring in the current branch such that
(x, xi) /∈ E for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x0 is a ‘fresh’ label not occurring in the
current branch.
xE : ϕ
x1Rx
′
1 , x
E∪{(x1,x′1)} : ϕ | . . . | xnRx′n , xE∪{(xn,x
′
n)} : ϕ

where {(x1, x′1), . . . , (xn, x′n)} = (M ×M) ∪ {(x+, x++)} \ E, with M the set of
labels occurring in the current branch to which we add a ‘fresh’ label x0, and
(x+, x++) is a pair of ‘fresh’ and distinct labels.
Fig. 5. Tableau rules for SML.
branch (labeled with ) from which we can extract a model whose frame is a
single reflexive point. This formula is thus satisfiable, and in fact only in this
frame. In Figure 6, on the left, we show that the tableau construction may not
necessarily terminate by exhibiting an infinite branch in the tableau for the
formula ♦>∧♦>. Even if the formula holds in finite pointed models having at
least two successors, our tableau method does not terminate with this formula
as input, and it produces a pointed model with infinitely many successors.
Finally, the reader may find it of interest to create a tableau for a formula
that really requires infinite models. Instead of doing this in tableau format, we
end by noting a particularly easy case where the Finite Model Property fails.
Example 6 (Failure of FMP in an extended logic). A somewhat complex failure
of FMP is given in [19]. Here we give a more concise formula that uses some
extra expressivity resources. Extend the SML language with a converse modality
P (for ‘past’— we can think of the above ♦ as ‘future’) plus a universal modality
U over all states. The successive conjuncts of the following formula then say that
the accessibility relation is a function, that is one-to-one, but not surjective:
U((♦> ∧ ⊥) ∧ (P> → ¬P>) ∧ E¬P>). (15)
Obviously, this statement can only be true in infinite models.
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x∅1 : ♦> ∧♦>
x∅1 : ♦> x∅1 : ♦>
x1Rx2
x∅2 : >
x
{(x1,x2)}
1 : ♦>
x1Rx3
x
{(x1,x2)}
3 : >
x
{(x1 x3)}
1 : ♦>
x∅1 : ♦> ∧♦> ∧⊥
x∅1 : ♦>
x∅1 : ♦>
x∅1 : ⊥
x1Rx2
x∅2 : >
x1Rx1
x∅1 : >
x∅2 : ♦> x∅1 : ♦>
x2Rx3
x∅3 : > x
{(x1,x1)}
1 : ⊥
x
{(x2,x3)}
1 : ⊥
x1Rx3
x
{(x1,x1)}
3 : >
x1Rx1
x
{(x1,x1)}
1 : >
x
{(x2,x3)}
2 : ⊥×
x
{(x1,x1)}
3 : ⊥×
x2Rx1
x∅1 : >
x2Rx2
x∅2 : >
x
{(x2,x1)}
1 : ⊥ x{(x2,x2)}1 : ⊥
x
{(x2,x1)}
2 : ⊥×
x
{(x2,x2)}
2 : ⊥×
∧
♦
¬
♦
¬
∧
♦ ♦
¬♦ ¬♦
♦ ¬
¬ ♦ ♦
¬♦¬♦
¬ ¬
¬♦ ¬♦
♦ ♦
Fig. 6. Two extreme scenarios. An infinite branch arising in the tableau for the
formula ♦> ∧♦> (left). A finite tableau for ♦> ∧♦> ∧⊥ (right).
5.2 Soundness and Completeness of the Tableau Method
The following result states the adequacy of our tableau method.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness). Let ϕ ∈ Ls. If ϕ is unsatis-
fiable, then the tableau for ϕ closes (completeness). If the tableau for ϕ closes
then ϕ is unsatisfiable (soundness).
Soundness Soundness is proved using the notion of interpretability. A set of
extended labeled formulas L is interpretable if there is a Kripke model M =
(W,R, V ) and a mapping f : S −→ W (recall that elements of S are used as
labels) such that for all xE : ϕ ∈ L, we have that (W,R \ f(E), V ), f(x) |= ϕ,
where f(E) = {(f(x1), f(x2)) | (x1, x2) ∈ E}. Then, we prove two facts:
Fact 2 If ϕ is satisfiable, then, at any step of the construction of the tableau for
ϕ, the set of extended labeled formulas of some branch is interpretable.
Fact 3 If ϕ is satisfiable, then any branch whose set of extended labeled formulas
is interpretable cannot close. That is, there is an extension of this interpretable
branch which does not close (so this extended branch is either open or infinite).
These two facts combined prove that, if ϕ is satisfiable, the tableau for ϕ cannot
close. Hence, if the tableau for ϕ closes, then ϕ is unsatisfiable (soundness).
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Proof (Fact 2). We prove the first fact by induction on the number n of times
we use inference rules in the construction of the tableau for ϕ. The case n = 0
holds trivially: in that case L is a singleton {x : ϕ} and it suffices to define f so
that it assigns to x the world of the Kripke model where ϕ is satisfiable.
The induction step n + 1 is proved by examining each rule on a case by
case basis. We show that for each rule we can extend the mapping f , which is
associated to an interpretable branch, in order to assign world(s) to the new
label(s) created by the application of the rule. We show then that we can also
extend the range of the accessibility relation R to assign a pair of worlds to
the new relation term created by the rule. In fact, we know by the Induction
Hypothesis that there is a branch of the tableau whose terms are all interpretable
by this mapping f . The key steps to consider concern the rules ♦ and .
– Rule ♦: Let the interpretable branch contain an extended labeled formula
xE : ♦ϕ (not chosen before when executing the tableau method). Applying
the rule ♦ to this interpretable branch, we obtain n+ 1 extended branches.
We must show that one of them is interpretable. By assumption, we have
(W,R \ f(E), V ), f(x) |= ♦ϕ. Hence, there is w ∈W such that f(x)Rw and
M, w |= ϕ. If w already corresponds to a label x′ such that f(x′) = w, then
we are in one of the first n extensions of the interpretable branch. In that
case, the map f need not be extended and the label x′ has already been in-
troduced in a rule earlier in the execution of the tableau method. Otherwise,
we are in the last case of the rule ♦ and we need to extend the mapping f
and assign to the ‘fresh’ label xn+1 the possible world w: we set f(xn+1) , w.
– Rule : Let the interpretable branch contain an extended labeled formula
xE : ϕ (not chosen before in the execution of the tableau method). Applying
Rule  to this interpretable branch, we get n extended branches correspond-
ing to the n elements of (M ×M) ∪ {(x+, x++)} \ E. We show that one of
them is interpretable. By assumption, we have (W,R \ f(E), V ), f(x) |= ϕ.
Therefore, there is a pair (w, v) ∈ R \ f(E) such that (W,R \ (f(E) ∪
{(w, v)}), V ), f(x) |= ϕ. This pair of worlds (w, v) is either of the form
(f(x0), f(x
′
0)), (f(x0), f(x0)), (f(x0), v), (w, f(x0)), (w,w) or simply (w, v),
for some labels x0, x
′
0 already introduced in this interpretable branch. The
first five cases are covered by some of the cases corresponding to the elements
of M ×M of rule  and the last case is covered by the case corresponding to
(x+, x++) of rule . So, at least one of the extended branches is interpretable
and we can extend the mapping f accordingly.
Proof (Fact 3). We proceed by contraposition. Assume that any extension of
the initial interpretable branch closes. Then, any such extension contains an
extended labeled formula xE : ϕ and its negation xE : ¬ϕ or two extended
labeled formulas xE : p and xF : ¬p. Hence the set of extended labeled formulas
of any extended branch is not interpretable. So, by Fact 2, since ϕ is satisfiable
by assumption, this entails that the set of extended labeled formulas of the initial
branch is also not interpretable, which is impossible by assumption. uunionsq
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Completeness We prove completeness by contraposition. Assume that the
tableau for ϕ does not close. Then, there is an open branch in the tableau for
ϕ. Let L be the set of extended labeled formulas appearing on this open branch
and let T be the set of relation terms appearing on this open branch. We build
the Kripke model M = (W,R, V ) as follows:
– W =
{
x | xE : ϕ ∈ L for some ϕ ∈ Ls and E ∈ 2S×S};
– R = {(x1, x2) | x1Rx2 ∈ T} and
– V (p) =
{
x ∈W | xE : p ∈ L}, for all p ∈ P.
Then, we have the following fact:
Fact 4 For all extended labeled formulas xE : χ,
if xE : χ ∈ L then (W,R \ E, V ), x |= χ. (16)
Proof. We prove Expression (16) by induction on the size of χ. The base case
χ = p holds by definition of V . We prove the induction steps:
– χ = ϕ ∧ ψ: Assume that xE : ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L. Then, by saturation of the tableau
rules, we also have that xE : ϕ and xE : ψ are in L. Then, by Induction
Hypothesis, we must have that (W,R\E, V ), x |= ϕ and (W,R\E, V ), x |= ψ.
Hence, we obtain that (W,R \ E, V ), x |= ϕ ∧ ψ.
– χ = ♦ϕ: Assume that xE : ♦ϕ ∈ L. Then, by saturation of the tableau rules,
there is xRx′ ∈ T such that (x, x′) /∈ E and x′E : ϕ ∈ L. Then, by Induction
Hypothesis, (W,R \ E, V ), x′ |= ϕ and (x, x′) ∈ R \ E. Hence, we have that
(W,R \ E, V ), x |= ♦ϕ.
– χ = ϕ: Assume that xE : ϕ ∈ L. Then, by saturation of the tableau rules,
there is xRx′ ∈ T such that (x, x′) /∈ E and xE∪{(x,x′)} : ϕ ∈ L. Then, by
Induction Hypothesis, (W,R \ (E ∪{(x, x′)}), V ), x |= ϕ and (x, x′) ∈ R \E.
Hence, we have that (W,R \ E, V ), x |= ϕ.
– χ = ¬p: Assume that xE : ¬p ∈ L and assume towards a contradiction that
(W,R\E, V ), x |= p. Then, by definition ofM, there is a set of pairs of labels
F such that xF : p ∈ L. However, if both xE : ¬p and xF : p belong to the
same branch, the branch cannot be open, which is impossible by assumption.
– χ = ¬(ϕ∧ψ): Assume that xE : ¬(ϕ∧ψ) ∈ L. By saturation of the tableau
rules, we have either that xE : ¬ϕ ∈ L or xE : ¬ψ ∈ L. Then, by Induction
Hypothesis, we have either that (W,R \E, V ), x |= ¬ϕ or (W,R \E, V ), x |=
¬ψ. In both cases, we obtain that (W,R \ E, V ), x |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ).
– χ = ¬¬ϕ: Assume that xE : ¬¬ϕ ∈ L. Then, by saturation of the tableau
rules, we obtain that xE : ϕ ∈ L. So, by Induction Hypothesis, we have that
(W,R \ E, V ), x |= ϕ, and therefore also (W,R \ E, V ), x |= ¬¬ϕ.
– χ = ¬♦ϕ: Assume that xE : ¬♦ϕ ∈ L. Then, for all xRx′ ∈ T such that
(x, x′) /∈ E, x′E : ¬ϕ ∈ L by saturation of the tableau rules. Therefore, by
Induction Hypothesis, (W,R \ E, V ), x′ |= ¬ϕ, for all (x, x′) ∈ R \ E. So,
(W,R \ E, V ), x |= ¬♦ϕ.
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A , X Y , A A is either x : p, x1Rx2 or (x1, x2)
x : ϕ , x : ψ , X Y
x : ϕ ∧ ψ , X Y
∧A
X Y , x : ϕ X Y , x : ψ
X Y , x : ϕ ∧ ψ
∧K
X Y , x : ϕ
x : ¬ϕ , X Y
¬A x : ϕ , X Y
X Y , x : ¬ϕ
¬K
x1Rx2 , x2 : ϕ , X Y x2 ∈ X ∪ {x0}
x1 : ♦ϕ , X Y
♦A
X Y , x2 : ϕ
x1Rx2 , X Y , x1 : ♦ϕ
♦K
x1Rx2 , (x1, x2) , x : ϕ , X Y (x1, x2) ∈ (X ∪ {x0})2 ∪ {(x+, x++)}
x : ϕ , X Y
A
(x1, x2) , X Y , x : ϕ
x1Rx2 , X Y , x : ϕ
K
X , X , Y Z
X , Y Z
CA
In all rules, (x1, x2) /∈ X, X,Y can be empty, x2 is not in the conclusion of ♦A.
Fig. 7. Cut-free labeled sequent calculus LSML for SML.
– χ = ¬ϕ. Assume that xE : ¬ϕ ∈ L. Then, by saturation of the rule ¬
of the tableau rules, for all x1Rx2 ∈ T such that (x1, x2) /∈ E, we must
have that xE∪{(x1,x2)} : ¬ϕ ∈ L. So, by Induction Hypothesis, this entails
that (W,R \ (E ∪ {(x1, x2)}), V ), x |= ¬ϕ for all (x1, x2) ∈ R \ E. That is,
(W,R \ E, V ), x |= ¬ϕ.
Thus, in particular, since x∅ : ϕ ∈ L is the root of the tableau for ϕ, we have
from Expression (16) that M, x |= ϕ. Hence, ϕ is satisfiable.
This proves the completeness of our tableau method.
5.3 A Labeled Sequent Calculus for SML
In classical logic, it is well-known that tableau methods and sequent calculi
are interdefinable: proof trees are negated tableau trees turned upside down.
Given that our tableau method is based on labeled formulas, we provide a labeled
sequent calculus for SML [20,38]. First, we define the set of structures LX :
LX : X ::= x : ϕ | xRx | (x, x) | X , X
where x ∈ S and ϕ ∈ Ls. We write x ∈ X when x is a label occurring in X and
X ∪ {x0} is the set of labels occurring in X to which we add the fresh label x0.
A sequent is an expression of the form X Y , X or X , where X,Y ∈ LX .
Theorem 4 (Soundness and completeness). Let ϕ ∈ Ls. Then, ϕ is valid
in SML if, and only if, x : ϕ is provable in LSML (defined in Figure 7).
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Proof (sketch). Soundness is standard. Completeness follows from Theorem 3
and the following fact: if the tableau for ¬ϕ closes then x : ϕ is provable
in LSML. Indeed, a closed tableau tree can be transformed into a proof tree in
LSML. Each closed tableau branch is transformed into a branch of the proof tree
whose leaf is the axiom x : p , X x : p, where X gathers all the terms oc-
curing in the tableau branch. Each tableau rule is transformed into a labeled
sequent calculus rule via the following correspondences: rules ∧,¬∧,¬¬ corre-
spond repectively to ∧A,¬K ∧K ¬A,¬K¬A, and rules ♦,¬♦,,¬ correspond
respectively to ♦A,¬K♦K¬A,A,¬KA¬A. Moreover, each time the same term
is used at several occasion in a tableau branch, we resort in the corresponding
proof tree of the sequent calculus LSML to the rule of contraction CA.
Corollary 1. The cut rule and the weakening rule are admissible in LSML.
6 SML and Other Logics for Relation Change
In the remainder of this paper, we present no further concrete results about SML,
but rather place sabotage modal logic against a broader background of logics for
relation change, or more generally, model change. We hope that the points to be
raised in this way lead toward a better understanding of a landscape of options
here that is slowly emerging in the many systems available today.
What is special about SML? Sabotage modal logic has a number of features
that make it like a modal logic. It is effectively axiomatizable via translation into
first-order logic, even by means of a first-order tableau system, and its expressive
power can be measured by invariance under a suitable notion of bisimulation.
But perhaps surprisingly, given its simple-looking syntax and semantics, its com-
plexity is high, validity being undecidable. What is the reason for this?
6.1 Dynamic-epistemic logic of relation change
One good way of approaching this issue is by comparison with another, and much
more widely known modal logic of relation change, namely dynamic-epistemic
logic of relation transformers. For a concrete example, think of the operation |ϕ
of ‘link cutting’ for a formula ϕ where, in the current accessibility relation R of
a given model, we follow this instruction:
Remove all pairs (s, t) where s, t disagree on the truth value of ϕ.
The following result is well-known (cf. for instance [51]).
Fact 5 The dynamic-epistemic logic of link cutting added on top of the basic
modal logic is completely axiomatizable, and it is also decidable.
The proof for this result goes by providing ‘recursion axioms’ in the typical
DEL style, that show how to recursively push dynamic modalities inside through
standard modalities. The key recursion axiom for link cutting looks as follows:
[|ϕ]ψ ↔ ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ [|ϕ]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ→ [|ϕ]ψ))) .
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Behind this result lies a much more general method, first presented in [51].
Any operation that replaces a relation R in a model by a new relation δ(R)
(definable sub-relations are an important special case) automatically generates
complete recursion axioms, provided that the transformation to δ(R) be definable
in the format of a program in propositional dynamic logic, PDL.12
So, what is the difference between the logics SML and DEL-style logics that
accounts for this different complexity behavior?
Three contrasts One clear difference is that DEL-style logics say precisely how
the new relation is to arise from the old ones: it concerns definable deletions,
as opposed to the arbitrary deletions of SML. Another contrast is that SML
is about global deletion anywhere in the model, whereas one might think that
things improve qua complexity when we work with local relation change only
at the current distinguished point of the model. But there is yet one more dis-
tinction that may well turn out to be the most crucial one. Definable DEL-style
relation change is simultaneous: all pairs not satisfying the given description are
eliminated. By contrast, SML works stepwise: it removes links one by one.
In what follows we make a few observations on the last two contrasts, since
the first one can be subsumed under these: SML performs stepwise deletions
from the universal (and hence definable) relation W ×W .
6.2 Stepwise versions of DEL
Intuitively, the stepwise nature of SML is a source of complexity, since it blocks
any obvious recursion axioms in the DEL style. The main reason is that dynamic
modalities cannot be pushed through negations the way they are in DEL, since
there can be many ways of performing an SML-deletion, whereas DEL style up-
dates are usually (partial) functions allowing for modality/negation interchanges,
as explained for instance in [46].
But also in more practical settings, it is well-known that changing classi-
cal simultaneous update scenarios such as the Puzzle of the Muddy Children
into sequential ones (where children speak in turn) can completely change what
happens in the long run, often even blocking any solution to the puzzle.
A good way of understanding the simultaneous/stepwise contrast is by im-
porting the latter into the heartland of dynamic-epistemic logic. We could do
this with the above link-cutting |ϕ, but an even simpler way of making the point
concerns ‘public announcement logic’ PAL whose actions !ϕ consists in removing
all ¬ϕ-worlds from the current model, assuming that the formula ϕ is true in the
distinguished ‘actual world’ of the current model. As above, PAL is completely
axiomatizable using recursion axioms, and it is a decidable logic. Now let us
introduce a new action −ϕ into this system that works stepwise:
〈−ϕ〉ψ is true at (M, s) iff, after removing some ¬ϕ-point, ψ holds in s.
12 For instance, for link cutting such a PDL program definition would look as follows:
(?ϕ;R; ?ϕ) ∪ (?¬ϕ;R; ?¬ϕ).
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It is easy to see that this new system, let us call it PALstep, changes the
nature of PAL considerably. As explained above, there are no obvious recursion
axioms, and even the basic modal invariance fails.
Fact 6 PALstep is not invariant for standard modal bisimulation.
To see that this is so, just consider one model where point s has one successor
t that is ¬p and another model where s has two successors t, t′ each having ¬p.
There is an obvious modal bisimulation between the two models, but 〈−p〉♦¬p
is true in the second model, but not in the first.
Even so, PALstep is clearly still translatable into first-order logic. However,
its behavior in terms of validity is much more opaque than that of PAL itself. In
fact, here is an obvious
Open Problem Is PALstep decidable?
Truly new semantic methods may be needed for solving problems like this,
and it may even be the case that PALstep sides with SML rather than PAL qua
complexity13 —and in that case, stepwiseness would override definability.
6.3 A local version of SML
Next, let us briefly consider another dimension of relation change, that might
be thought to mitigate the high complexity. Instead of global versions, let us
now look at local versions of our systems. For a start consider locSML, a system
that arises by specializing everything that we have defined for SML to deletions
of links that start at the distinguished point of the current model.14 Here we
provide a few observations to increase familiarity with this system.
Some validities All the principles listed earlier (Formulas (1) to (6)) as validities
of SML are also valid in locSML. Now we exhibit some differences.
Fact 7 The following formula is valid in locSML, but not in SML:
⊥ → ⊥ (17)
And the following formula is valid in SML, but not in locSML:
(♦♦> ∧⊥)→ (ϕ→ ϕ) (18)
We leave the easy verifications to the reader. In the second formula, the global
reading of the deletion modality  in the antecedent enforces that the current
point is reflexive (cf. formula (14)), whereas a local reading would not.
13 Intuitively, deleting points looks like deleting all links arriving or leaving at them.
14 A different type of ‘local’ sabotage is studied in [1,4], whose modality refers to the
model transformation that deletes an outgoing edge from the evaluation point and
moves the evaluation point to the target of the deleted arrow.
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Local locSML vs. global SML. The above remarks highlight the interest of the
relation between global sabotage modal logic and its local variant. Within the
compass of this paper, we merely provide a few observations.
In one direction, it seems that locSML comes close to being inside SML. We
have not been able to settle this in complete detail, but here is one observation
about the special class of finitely-branching models.
Fact 8 With finite branching, locSML is invariant under sabotage bisimulation.
Proof. Let Z be a sabotage bisimulation between two finitely-branching mod-
els (M, w) and (M′, w′). The atomic and Boolean cases are routine. The Zig♦
and Zag♦ clauses of Definition 2 take care of ♦-formulas in a standard way
familiar from basic modal logic. As for -formulas (where  denotes now the
local variant of sabotage), assume that M, w |= ϕ. By the semantics of , we
have (M, w)r(M1, w) and M1, w |= ϕ where M1 is obtained via a local dele-
tion and, by clause Zig of Definition 2, it follows that (M′, w′)r(M′1, w′) and
(M1, w)Z(M′1, w′). Here the second deletion could be non-local in general, but
in our special class, it cannot be. There must be a local deletion that witnesses
the transition toM′1, for otherwise the finite number of successors in (M, w) and
(M′, w′) would differ, which is not possible under the sabotage bisimulation that
still obtains between (M, w) and (M′, w′)—as we have shown in our discussion
of the expressive power of SML.15 By the induction hypothesis, we then conclude
that M′1, w′ |= ϕ and, consequently, M′, w′ |= ϕ. Completely similarly, from
M′, w′ |= ϕ, we conclude M, w |= ϕ by clause Zag of Definition 2. uunionsq
If we could show that locSML is invariant for all sabotage bisimulations, then,
by the obvious first-order translation of locSML-formulas, our main characteri-
zation in Theorem 2 would imply that locSML is embeddable into SML.
Next, we consider the opposite direction. We show how to translate SML-
formulas into locSML-formulas, when some extra expressivity typical of hybrid
logics [5] is added: the universal modality and the binder ↓. Let us first fix the
translation (with the atomic case and Boolean clauses omitted):16
t(ϕ) ,↓ x.(x ∧ ElE(x ∧ t(ϕ)))
where E is the diamond of the universal modality, x is a state variable and l
denotes the local sabotage operator. It is easy to see that:
Fact 9 For any formula ϕ of SML and pointed model (M, w):
M, w |= ϕ iff M, w |= t(ϕ).
where t is the translation defined above.
15 This brute-force argument would fail in the presence of infinitely many successors.
16 From a hybrid logic point of view, we are now extending the hybrid logic known as
H(E, ↓) with a local sabotage operator. Hybrid logics will return in Section 8.
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However, the price is high. It is known that standard modal logic plus the binder
and the universal modality is equivalent to the first-order correspondence lan-
guage itself (cf. [5]). Perhaps much weaker means would suffice. So, the direct
relation from SML into locSML remains unresolved.
Given this uncertainty about the precise relation between global and local
sabotage logic, the complexity of reasoning in the latter also poses questions:
Open Problem Is locSML decidable?
Our inclination is to doubt this, but we have not been able to give a proof.
6.4 Excursion: local DEL
Instead of pursuing the issues raised so far, we merely note that ‘going local’
need not be a force for simplicity in the other realm that we have contrasted
with SML, namely, dynamic-epistemic logic DEL.
Suppose that we define a local version of link-cutting |ϕloc as cutting links
only between the current world and its accessible worlds. There are many con-
crete scenarios where this makes sense, for instance, when describing some local
event of changing a communication link between agents in a network (cf. [42]).17
Again we will see immediately that the typical DEL method of recursion axioms
is going to fail. For, when we push a dynamic modality under a standard modal-
ity over successors of the current world, the link-cutting change is no longer local
in these successors: it takes place somewhere else.
Localization and hybrid logic Now, this problem can be solved, since, as
in all logics that we are discussing here, all changes take place definably inside
first-order logic. But in order to find recursion axioms for local link-cutting, or
similar local relation-changing operations, we will have to be able to refer back
to other worlds where local changes took place. In first-order terms, this means
that we need a mechanisms for variable binding. In modal terms, we can use
devices from hybrid logics [5], such as the universal modality, and especially the
‘binder’ ↓, to which we referred also in the previous section. It is a relatively
standard exercise to provide recursion axioms for local link-cutting in a hybrid
modal language, but we will not do so here. However, there is no guarantee that
such a hybrid extension of the modal base logic is still decidable, since hybrid
logic with a universal modality plus downarrow is undecidable.18
In all, we conclude that introducing locality may be natural, but its com-
plexity effects on logics of relation change are still ill-understood.
17 In [42] the authors assimilate this case to that of DEL-style deletions when the link
to be deleted runs between two worlds having unique nominals as their names.
18 As we observed earlier, hybrid logic with a universal modality plus the binder ↓ is
equivalent to the first-order correspondence language. It would be of interest to push
things down to, say, hybrid logic with the ‘at-operator’ @ plus the binder, but even
then we are in the undecidable ‘Bounded Fragment’ of the first-order language.
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General logics of model change We have identified a few general dimensions
that affect design and complexity of logics for relation change. Clearly, there are
many more systems of this sort that we could discuss here: even DEL itself has
developed more sophisticated update mechanisms than those that we presented.
But we hope to return to the more general structure of this landscape in follow-
up work. Here, we will just make a few references to further modal and first-order
logics of relation change in Section 8, and give a first rough road map.
7 Sabotage Games and Fixpoint Logics
So far, we have looked at dynamic logics that describe single steps of model
change, or more concretely, relation change. But the original sabotage game
motivating a logic like SML was a many-step scenario unfolding over time, and
these games have strategic global structure in the long run, going beyond local
steps. What logic would naturally represent this structure? In this section we
offer a few remarks that may clarify this issue, and show its interest.
7.1 The sabotage game
The sabotage game was introduced in [44], further studied in [34], and more
recently in [24,53], and [47, Ch. 23]. It can be viewed as a game variant of a
reachability problem where a player, Traveler, aims at reaching a predefined goal
state (or goal region), while obstructed by the second player, Demon. We provide
a short presentation of the game but we refer the reader to the above literature
for more details and motivations, which range from studying the performance of
algorithms under adverse circumstances to scenarios in learning theory.
The game is played on a frame (W,R) with a designated point w correspond-
ing to the starting position of Traveler, and a designated non-empty subset
G ⊆ W (typically, a singleton for some designated point to be reached) corre-
sponding to the ‘goal’ region of Traveler. Traveler moves locally by navigating
the edges of R, one at the time, thereby constructing a path. Demon moves by
deleting edges from R. The game proceeds in turns with Demon moving first.
Traveler wins if she has reached her goal region. Otherwise Demon wins.
The sabotage game as defined above is a, possibly infinite, two-player, zero-
sum, perfect information extensive form game. As such it is determined, that is,
either Traveler or Demon has a winning strategy. In the case in which the graph
W is finite, this determinacy is a consequence of Zermelo’s theorem [55]. In the
general case, determinacy follows from the Gale-Stewart theorem [23], as it is
easy to see that the set of runs of the sabotage game where Traveler wins by
reaching the goal is an open set in a standard topological sense.19
However, the case of reachability in standard directed graphs that has been
paradigmatic for this paper trivializes the sabotage game. In the case in which
Traveler’s goal region is represented by a single state (that is, the original sabo-
tage scenario), we have the following simple fact:
19 Cf. [47] on the background of these results in current logics of games.
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Fact 10 Let (W,R) be a directed graph. If the goal region G ⊆W is a singleton
not containing the initial position of Traveler, then the Demon has a winning
strategy in the sabotage game played on (W,R).
Proof. Unless Traveler started in the exit point, Demon has a winning strategy.
Demon cuts the link between the current position of the Traveler and the exit
node if there is such a link, otherwise he cuts an arbitrary link. If Demon keeps
doing this, Traveler never reaches the exit node. In a finite game, this is enough.
On an infinite graph, this game can be infinite, but Demon will always produce
infinite histories where Traveler does not reach the exit. This is enough. uunionsq
Obviously this trivialization does not go through if Traveler’s goal region contains
more than one state, perhaps defined by some goal formula, and this is the more
general setting that we will assume in what follows.20
As we will see now, a natural extension of the language of SML can yield the
expressivity to characterize winning positions in the sabotage game. It reflects
a much more general point about game solutions, developed at length in [47]:
game-theoretic equilibria are definable in fixed-point logics for induction and
recursion, and often even, in modal fixed-point logics.
7.2 Expressing winning regions in the sabotage game
Our earlier observations pose tests for logics of sabotage games. In particular,
Fact 10 suggests that the basic sabotage modal logic SML, possibly with some
extra resources, should be able to express the existence of Demon’s winning
strategy as a validity. Here is such a formula, using two additional modal devices:
U((¬goal ∧ ♦>)→ ¬goal) (19)
with U the universal modality and goal a nominal for the goal point.
Next, for arbitrary goal regions (singletons or not) defined by the formula
goal, the original paper [44] observes how the existence of winning strategies for
Traveler can be expressed in a PDL-format over SML. At least on finite graphs,
the winning positions for Traveler can be defined using an operator for finite
iteration, by the formula:
(♦> ∧♦)∗goal (20)
capturing the infinitary disjunction goal ∨ (♦> ∧ ♦goal) ∨ (♦> ∧ ♦(♦> ∧
♦goal)) . . . and so forth. Notice that the conjunct ♦> is required to rule out
as a winning position the situation in which there are no edges to be deleted in
the model but Traveler is not in a goal state. This characterization of Traveler’s
winning positions, however, does not work on infinite graphs, and in general, a
more expressive language is needed.
20 Other non-trivial variations arise when Traveler is allowed to move first, or if more
than one link is allowed between points (the original sabotage game was played over
‘multi-graphs’), or if we allow multi-relational frames, as in [34].
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Let us consider a µ-calculus language µSML in order to define winning posi-
tions for Traveler (and Demon) with formulas whose syntax matches the chosen
definition of winning positions. Let P be a set of propositional atoms. Formulas
of the sabotage modal language Lµ have the following grammar in BNF:
Lµ : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ♦ϕ | ϕ | µp.ϕ(p)
where p ∈ P and ϕ(p) indicates that p occurs free in ϕ (i.e., it is not bounded by
fixpoint operators) and under an even number of negations. Here, just as ordinary
modalities, sabotage modalities do not affect positive or negative occurrence.
Fixpoint operators allow us to generalize Formula (20) and characterize the
set of Traveler’s winning positions in its full generality, via the formula:
µp.(goal ∨ (♦> ∧♦p)) (21)
We have not given a precise semantics for µSML yet, but intuitively the
formula makes sense for our game. Traveler is in a region that includes the goal
points and to which she can return no matter what Demon deletes.
By the determinacy of the sabotage game, the dual formula of (21) should
then define the winning region for Demon, which is therefore the largest fixpoint
of the equation p↔ ¬goal∧(⊥∨p). Viewed in this light, the earlier Formula
(19) for Demon stated that ¬goal is such greatest fixpoint for singleton goals.
Notice how the very shape of the above fixed-point formula mirrors the precise
winning conventions of the game for the players. Clearly, this is a general and
flexible feature of logical syntax, to which we will return later on.
7.3 The sabotage µ-calculus: µSML
To make the preceding precise, we need to specify the semantics of µSML. This
may seem obvious: one copies the standard definitions for the µ-calculus21 and
adds a clause for , noting that this new operator does not affect positive occur-
rence. The logic resulting from this obvious extension of the µ-calculus semantics
has indeed been studied in [40]. However, this does not yield the intended se-
mantics for analyzing our games, as shown by the following example.
Example 7. Consider a graph with verticesW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and directed edges
R = {(3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 3), (4, 2), (5, 4), (5, 3)}, whose goal region goal is {1, 2}.
Computing, bottom up, the successive approximation stages for the function
denoted by goal ∨ (♦> ∧♦p) yields this sequence of subsets of the graph:
∅, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
which ends in the fixpoint {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The reason is that, as the set grows,
further points get at least two successors inside it, so one link deletion can never
21 The standard clause is M, w |= µp.ϕ(p) iff w ∈
⋂{
X ∈ 2W | ||ϕ||M[p:=X] ⊆ X
}
,
where ||ϕ||M[p:=X] is the truth-set of ϕ with V (p) set to be X.
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Fig. 8. Graph on which the sabotage game is played in Example 7.
prevent them from getting there. However, this outcome is wrong, since point 5
is not a winning position for Traveler in the graph game as we have defined it.
Demon can win by starting with cutting the link (3, 1) and then continuing to
cut appropriately as Traveler tries to move to a goal point.
What has gone wrong here? The problem is the model-changing character
of the modality : the same formula may get different truth values at the same
points in the two models before and after a link deletion. Using a mere set of
points as the current approximation does not keep track of this in the right way.
An improved semantics that does work will only be sketched here.
One direct approach defines syntactic approximation formulas ϕα for each
ordinal α, in an infinitary version of sabotage modal logic SML. In any given
model, this sequence will stabilize at some stage after which all later formulas in
the sequence have the same truth-set, thereby computing the smallest fixpoint.
Of course, the formula at that stage may depend on the size of the model.22
But our preferred approach is semantic, changing the relevant universe of
evaluation to better fit our intuitions, and in line with the notion of sabotage
bisimulation (Definition 2). Instead of working on just the original graph, we
consider a dynamic model M consisting of this graph and all those obtainable
from it by edge deletions. We take the points of this new model to be pointed
models (M, s), and let the modality ♦ access the relation between (M, s), (M, t)
with (s, t) ∈ RM, and  access the sabotage relation r between (M, s) and
(M−, s) where M− arises from M by deleting one directed edge.23 Now we
can just compute on this model with the original formula, and get an increasing
family of sets that yields the same results as the syntactic procedure.
We leave it to the reader to recompute the earlier example in terms of pointed
models, and check that we now get the intended interpretation.
22 One might think that this is the same as working with just sets, since in the standard
µ-calculus, ‘call by name’ and ‘call by value’ are equivalent in the approximation
procedure. But this only holds in one fixed model, not across models where, as we
saw in the above example, truth values can differ.
23 Essentially, we are now in a bimodal model of a special sort, where the atomic goal
formula holds for the same points across different sub-graphs.
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The system obtained in this way is not a simple extension of the µ-calculus.
It is still easy to show that µSML formulas are invariant under sabotage bisim-
ulation. It is less clear, however, how to extend the earlier standard translation
ST . It might seem to extend immediately to a translation into FO(LFP), the
extension of first-order logic with fixed-point operations, by taking modal µp to
first-order µP, x. But this fails to capture evaluation with different truth values
across models. Finally, there is a major issue of complexity. This can be illus-
trated with the logic PAL∗ of public announcement logic with finitely iterated
announcements. Its formulas 〈(!ϕ))∗〉ψ may be seen as solutions for a fixpoint
formula µp.ψ ∨ 〈!ϕ〉p computed in our sense across different models. But [36]
shows that, unlike the µ-calculus, this system is undecidable, in fact its satisfia-
bility problem is Π11 -complete. We leave these matters for future investigation.
Coda Our semantic view with pointed models as the new indices of evaluation
also has some independent interest, in that it suggests a natural generalization.
A universe need not be a full ‘standard model’ with all possible variants, say
some initial model plus the family of all its sub-models. We could also allow
only ‘admissible models’ in the universe according to some criterion, giving us
much more variety in patterns for the model shifts.24 On such more general
models, the complexity of our logical systems might well decrease.
7.4 General graph games
The general background for the topic of this section is that of graph games. To
put the sabotage game in perspective, we briefly consider two more such games.
The travel game For a start, here is a simple game that leaves a given graph
unchanged. In the Travel Game, Demon picks an outgoing edge of the current
point, Traveler has to pick an edge to move from there, and so forth. This time,
Traveler wins if Demon cannot issue a challenge (i.e., we are at an endpoint
that is Demon’s turn), or if Traveler can keep moving forever. This game has
been applied widely to model-checking or other logical tasks (cf. [45]), given the
great freedom in what we can define to be a graph for the task at hand. The
game is determined, and winning positions can be described simply in the modal
µ-calculus. Those for Traveler are given by the greatest fixed-point formula
νp.♦p (22)
The modal µ-calculus is a high-level theory of this, and similar graph games.
In contrast with the above, the Sabotage Game changes the underlying graph
drastically.25 Accordingly, winning conditions required using a µ-calculus ex-
tended with sabotage modalities (cf. Section 7.3).
24 Such universes are studied in dynamic-epistemic logic as ‘protocol models’, cf. [49].
25 One might think this reduces to a Travel Game over a ‘supergraph’ of ordinary graphs
related by sabotage steps. But, given the complexity results we cited for sabotage
modal logic, this translation necessarily blows up computational complexity.
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The poison game Finally, consider a game that does not change graph links,
but that changes the ‘annotation’ of a graph: i.e., unary properties of its nodes.
The Poison Game of [17] has Demon issuing a challenge as in the Travel Game,
while Traveler has to respond. However, now Demon ‘poisons’ each node that he
visits, making it inaccessible to Traveler: she loses if she visits a poisoned node.
Traveler wins this game if she can keep going. In the game of the cited paper,
the first move is for Traveler, who picks any node as a starting point.
This game captures an important graph-theoretic notion. A ‘local kernel’ is a
non-empty set of nodes that has no internal edges (a so-called independent set),
while for every edge leading outside the set, there is a follow-up edge returning
into the set.26 It can be proved relatively easily that, on finite branching and
upward well founded graphs, there is a local kernel if and only if Traveler has a
winning strategy.
But the Poison Game also has independent interest, and describing winning
positions for Traveler suggests the following definition for the winning positions
of the Traveler. Consider a µ-calculus with a special predicate P for ‘poisoned’,
and an added modality [+P ]ϕ which says that ϕ holds at the current point s of
the model after this has been poisoned. That is, the operation +P changes the
current interpretation for P to add the singleton s.
νq.¬P ∧[+P ]♦q (23)
Intuitively, this language with a dynamic poison modality seems intermediate
between the pure µ-calculus and the sabotage µ-calculus.27 The poison modal-
ity involves only what is called ‘factual change’ of propositional valuations in
dynamic-epistemic logic [52]. There are recursion axioms for this modality push-
ing it through all other operators, turning formulas into equivalent static ones.
Still, even though the modal µ-calculus is closed under DEL product update [50],
we believe that our caveat for µSML applies also to the a µ-calculus extended
with the poison modality, and a new semantics is needed.
8 Related Work
8.1 Other recent studies of sabotage logic
As we have noted right at the start, the complexity and model-theory of SML has
been studied extensively in a recent series of works [1,3,2,4] and [19]. In particular
[19,4] established that the model-checking problem of SML is PSPACE-complete,
that SML lacks the finite model property, the tree-model property and that
its satisfiability problem is undecidable. This considerably improved the same
26 In modal terms, p defines a semi-kernel of the underlying frame, if and only if the
formula Ep∧U(p→ ((¬p∧p)) holds in the model, with E the global existential
modality, and U the universal modality.
27 For some results on basic modal logics of poisoning, see also [35].
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Fig. 9. An attack graph.
results obtained for the multi-modal variant of SML in [34,33]. Our paper con-
tributes further results—specifically, a charaterization theorem—to this specific
line of research on the model-theory of SML.
The cited authors also introduce a tableau method for SML in [2]. They
use a special system of nominals in their tableaux, which represent possible
worlds. This allows more control over the application of the tableau rules than
the calculus in this paper. Indeed, in the rules  and ♦, instead of considering
all possible combinations of nominals as we do, their method uses a refinement
of the usual diamond rule of modal logic with nominals, together with an extra
rule called (ub) that suitably ‘controls’ the combination of all the nominals. Even
though these features may make the tableaux in [2] slightly less transparent in
terms of how the rules relate to the underlying semantics of SML it may well
make the system more efficient than ours from a computational standpoint.
8.2 Argumentation games
Abstract argumentation theory [18] studies criteria for tenability of positions
in argumentation. Its key structures are directed ‘attack graphs’ (frames) G =
(W,R) where W is a non-empty set of arguments and R is a binary relation
aRb interpreted intuitively as saying that argument b attacks (is stronger than)
argument a.28 All graphs illustrated in this paper can therefore be interpreted
as attack graphs, but we provide a further example in Figure 9.
A basic question is: given an attack graph, which set of arguments can be
rationally upheld? Answers give rise to different criteria for the ‘quality’ of sets
of arguments. We list some basic ones in Table 1. As shown in a series of works
[26,27,28,22], all these notions have a modal character, making modal (fixpoint)
logics a natural tool for argumentation theory. In particular,
µp.♦p (24)
defines the notion of grounded set [26,27,22], that is, the set of arguments that
can always be ultimately defended by a set of unattacked arguments. This intu-
ition is naturally illustrated by the stages of approximation of Formula (24): the
28 In the literature on abstract argumentation edges are interpreted in the opposite
direction: aRb represents that argument a attacks argument b.
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X is conflict-free iff @a, b ∈ X s.t. aRb
X is self-defended iff ∀a, b if a ∈ X and aRb then ∃c ∈ X s.t. bRc
X is a complete set iff X is conflict-free and X = {a | ∀b, if aRb then ∃c ∈ X and bRc}
X is the grounded set iff X is the smallest complete set
Table 1. Some key notions of abstract argumentation theory from [18].
empty set; the set of arguments whose attackers are in turn attacked by argu-
ments in the empty set, that is, the unattacked arguments; and so forth. Formula
(24) defines the winning positions in a game for Traveler (the ‘Proponent’ in ar-
gumentation theory) who wins if, and only if, she reaches an argument that is
unattacked, while Demon (the ‘Opponent’) is out of counter-arguments.29
Games played on attack graphs occur in the argumentation literature as ‘di-
alectical’ procedures for ‘static’ structural criteria of acceptability of arguments
(see [37] for an overview). For instance, a close relative of our earlier poison
game is the game for ‘credulous admissibility’ in [54]. Traveler selects attacks
to the last argument selected by Demon and, as in the poison game, cannot
select any argument previously selected by Demon. Demon plays by selecting
attacks to any argument previously selected by Traveler, being allowed to back-
track. Demon starts. Traveler wins if she does not run out of counter-arguments.
It can be shown [54] that Traveler has a winning strategy if, and only if, the
initial argument is included in a conflict-free and self-defended set (that is, a
semi-kernel).
Again, suitably enriched fixpoint logics can capture such games. For instance,
using the notation of Section 7.4, Traveler’s winning positions are defined by
νq.((V ∧ ¬P ) ∧ U(V → [+P ]♦[+V ]q)) (25)
with U the universal modality, P the ‘poison’ predicate, while V keeps track of
the points visited by Traveler. A modal logic of graph games as envisioned in our
paper may well have significant applications to abstract argumentation theory.
8.3 Landscape of logics for model change
Often triggered directly by the initial work on dynamic-epistemic logic and sab-
otage modal logic, many further logics of graph modifiers have been proposed in
the recent literature than what we have covered here. Besides the above men-
tioned series of work [1,3,2,4], relevant systems include local and global graph
29 It may be instructive to compare Formulas (22) and (24). Fom an argumentation-
theoretic point of view, the second imposes a more stringent behavior on Traveler,
forcing Demon to get stuck, while the first allowsTraveler to simply ‘keep going’.
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modifiers [8], dynamic epistemic modifiers [11,10], dynamic modal logic DML
[15], arrow logic [31], logics of copy and remove [6], the logic of preference up-
grade [51], and general dynamic dynamic logic [25].30
Instead of discussing the above terrain in detail, we give a small ‘expressive-
ness map’ based on what can readily be observed, and on what authors have
claimed.31 In Figure 10, an arrow L1 → L2 means that logic L1 is strictly more
expressive than L2. When there is no arrow between two logics, they are incom-
parable in terms of expressiveness. Here is how one can read the map.
At the bottom level, there is just basic modal logic, which is expressively
equivalent to dynamic modal logic DML (cf. [15]), arrow logic (cf. [31]) and
preference upgrade logic (cf. [51]). One step up, at the middle level of our map,
we find SML and the other logics inspired by it later, such as swap logic, bridging
logic, and local sabotage logic in the sense of [1,3].32 From the cited publications,
we know that these mid-level systems are incomparable in terms of expressivity,
that they are also strictly more expressive than the basic modal logic (cf. [4])
and, at the same time, strictly less expressive than the full hybrid language with
universal modality plus binders (cf. [2]). Incidentally, some of these intermediate
systems (e.g., swap logic) have been also shown to be strictly less expressive than
the so-called Bounded Fragment of FOL, which is undecidable, but still natural,
cf. [3]. Finally, the logic of local and global graph modifiers proposed in [8] arose
from combining features of all these systems, and it has been shown to be at
least as expressive as hybrid logic with the universal modality plus binders—that
is, the full FOL correspondence language.
A similar map would make sense for fixed-point extensions of the logics in this
paper. In Section 7, we used the modal µ-calculus, and extensions with DEL-style
dynamic modalities. Another natural extension given our comparison of sabotage
logics and dynamic-epistemic logics is a fixed-point logic µ(↓, U) containing the
base modalities plus the universal modality and the hybrid binders. This provides
the expressive power needed to deal with local sabotage and other dynamic
operations that have embedded references to earlier points of evaluation. The
literature on graph change also contains other such systems,33 many of them
in between the modal µ-calculus and the logic LFP(FO), first-order logic with
fixed-point operators. The latter system is Π11 -complete, but it forms a natural
limit for many fixpoint logics. However, we have also introduced a sabotage µ-
calculus that seemed a much more radical expressive extension. Even lacking a
road map like our earlier one, we believe that just an awareness of this realm
30 Also relevant here is [21] on ‘reactive logics’, where the accessibility relation of modal
models is changed during the interpretation process of formulas.
31 Here we disregard logics with Kleene ∗ or fixed-point extensions, where things can
be different. In particular, we do not treat general dynamic dynamic logic [25], which
is equivalent to PDL. Also, we were unable to fit in the logics of copy and remove.
32 As observed earlier (footnote 14) the system of ‘local’ sabotage from [1,3] is subtly
different from the one we considered in this paper.
33 For other interesting extended µ-calculi, see, for instance, [40] and [41].
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LocGML [8]
SML [44] Swap [1,4] Bridging [1,4] Local sabotage a` la [1,4]
Arrow logic [31]
Preference upgrade logic [51]
DML [15], DEL [11,10]
Fig. 10. Expressiveness map of some dynamic modal logics for graph modifiers.
beyond first-order logic poses interesting challenges, such as exploring the reach
of current automata-theoretic methods for fixpoint logics.
Of course, comparing logics by mere expressiveness is a drastic projection of
their different dynamic motivations, and our map is only a first step. We can
compare these systems in other ways, and in particular, the stated equivalences
are all up for further investigation if we generalize to temporal protocol models,
where the usual reduction axioms become invalid. We leave a more sensitive and
detailed analysis of the area of logic for model change to future work.34
9 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have dusted off sabotage modal logic, and looked at its broader
current relevance. We gave a first-order translation for this logic, proved a novel
characterization theorem in terms of a new notion of sabotage bisimulation, and
introduced a sound and complete tableau system and sequent calculus.
Still, SML remains an under-investigated system. For instance, we noted that
the schematic validities of SML form a natural subset whose axiomatizability, or
decidability, is an open problem. Another natural theme is modal correspondence
34 Our discussion here has been model-theoretic, in terms of semantic invariances and
expressive power. But there are also other ways of achieving generality in the rich
and growing landscape of dynamic logics for model change. Alternatively, one could
use algebraic methods, category-theoretic methods, or proof-theoretic perspectives,
which might suggest systematizations of their own. One such alternative approach
that we would like to mention specifically for its general power, is the framework of
‘update logic’ [7], based on display-style substructural proof theory.
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theory, whose techniques extend into higher-order logic [43]. In particular, can
the Sahlqvist theorem be generalized to SML? Also, in this paper, we arrived at
natural variations of SML, such as its version with only local deletions, whose
decidability is open.35 Next, given the apparent complexity of the system, it
makes sense to look at natural fragments, such as the closed formulas that formed
many of our examples, or the formulas of sabotage depth 1. Alternatively, in line
with a suggestion in Section 8.3, we could look at ‘protocol models’ [49], that
restrict the sequences of available link deletions between graphs, giving rise to
bimodal models with an ‘internal’ accessibility relation R for ♦ and an ‘external’
relation r for . Finally, we also found SML-inspired new versions of dynamic-
epistemic logics, such as stepwise PAL, whose properties seem unknown.
Next, we have presented sabotage modal logic as a member of a species, that
of modal logics describing model changes. We have identified some of its basic
features, and in particular, its arbitrary non-definable and stepwise character,
setting it apart, for instance, from the better-studied DEL world. We see our way
of looking as the start of something more ambitious, finding a better map of the
whole field of logics for model change, and the major parameters that determine
their complexity. But to us, the greatest challenge would be a general perspective
on dynamic logics of model change that leads to general theorems beyond those
for specific logics. We made some suggestions to this effect in Section 8, but
clearly this was just a start.
Next, returning to the games that motivated SML in the first place, we dis-
cussed sabotage µ-calculus as a system for defining strategic powers of players,
and as a testing ground for introducing model-changing modalities that can
affect the process of approximation leading to the usual smallest or greatest
fixed-points. The system we define seems a very natural object of study in its
own right. And as we have seen in Section 8, it suggests broader issues about
the landscape of further fixed-point logics for model change.
But more importantly than just studying logics, the sabotage game reminds
us of a general issue of gamification: the use of newly designed games to model
significant computational or social scenarios, as argued for in [47].
Sabotage games model real dynamic scenarios unfolding over time, beyond
one-step model changes. There are many natural variations on the original sce-
nario in [44] —and these may serve as pilots for more general games played over
networks, such as the argumentation games of [26,22] discussed earlier, or the
social network games of [48] and [14].36 Such network games need not be about
35 Other natural variations include multi-modal SML with indices for the relations to
be cut, [34,33], or logics of adding links, like the aforementioned modal logics of
bridging [4]. In this connection, note that adding links to R is the same as deleting
links from the complement −R, so there are connection laws to be had.
36 Work in these areas also shows that gamification is not unique. For instance, the
µ-calculus formulas that we have used to describe games themselves have standard
evaluation games, and the connection between games, describing formulas, and eval-
uation games for the latter is often an intriguing one.
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‘sabotage’ at all, and the general area becomes that of games that may change
their own playground, for which this paper has provided some logical tools.
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